Saurav Raj Pant, a columnist and correspondent for Bindu-Oped, interviewed Nilanthi Samaranayake, a security analyst, author, and speaker based in Washington, D.C. She has expertise in the Indian Ocean, South Asia, and U.S. alliances and partnerships. Her research focuses on U.S. strategy toward the Indian Ocean, the Indian Navy, small states in great-power rivalry, and non-traditional security.
The interview centers on small states, the U.S.-China and India-China rivalry in Nepal, and how Nepal can navigate its foreign policy. Presented below is an edited excerpt of that discussion. These are her personal views and research.
- How does the concept of ‘small states in great-power rivalry’ apply in South Asia compared to regions like Southeast Asia or the Pacific Islands?
The broader trend across these regions is a US-China competition and an India-China competition that have been evident for more than a decade. As a result, there are questions about how smaller countries should navigate this strategic competition. Yet, there are some differences across these regions for smaller countries to note. For example, the increasing priority of the Pacific waters for the United States, and the expansion of India’s military capabilities and reach in the Indian Ocean region.
- In today’s shifting geopolitics, how is Nepal navigating between India’s regional dominance, China’s growing influence, and U.S. strategic interests in the Indian Ocean?
Nepal has indeed been navigating India as the regionally dominant power, as well as China and the US in their global competition. While it is not a simple task for Nepal as a smaller state, it is not new. Nepal has long understood its unique geography and critical role in India’s threat perceptions, but still desires standard forms of engagement with as many partners as possible.
For instance, Nepal is expected to graduate from Least Developed Country (LDC) status in November 2026. LDC graduation will intensify the need for Nepal to cultivate a wide array of bilateral and institutional development partners as the country will lose access to benefits of being an LDC and will need to update its approach to international lending and finance. This situation is heightened in the context of a new US administration seeking to withdraw from the US’s role as a leading international development partner. At present in Nepal’s favor, the Trump administration has indicated its willingness to continue the US Millennium Challenge Corporation compact with Kathmandu despite its wider move away from foreign assistance. Meanwhile, Nepal has learned lessons from other Smaller South Asian countries and their experiences with China. For example, Nepal has been cautious about incurring costly loans from China and prefers to seek grants for financing development projects. After much delay, former Prime Minister Oli signed a Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) framework agreement in December 2024 but BRI implementation has been delayed.
- How has Nepal’s foreign policy evolved amid India–China competition, and is there a risk it might appear too aligned with one side?
India-China competition complicates Smaller South Asian countries’ freedom of action. As a result, their leaders acknowledge this competition while emphasizing their distance from it. In Nepal, former Prime Minister Oli stated last year that “economic, strategic, and diplomatic competitive rivalry among the major power nations and the regional powers have gradual impacts on the country’s economic and foreign relations policies.” The previous year, then-Prime Minister Dahal affirmed Nepal’s careful stance in the context of this rivalry: “we cannot wade into security-related issues. It is our stated policy not to be under the umbrella of any side. Ours is a non-aligned foreign policy.” There is a tendency to view Nepal as needing to align with either India or China, yet structurally Nepal as a smaller state would be wise to work with all the major powers and multilateral development banks for much-needed economic advancement.
- What role do non-traditional security issues—such as climate change, migration, or resource scarcity—play in shaping the decisions of small South Asian states in great-power politics?
Non-traditional security issues play a significant role in creating challenges for Smaller South Asian countries to deal with in addition to more familiar, traditional security involving large powers. Today, there’s a need for even more bilateral and multilateral cooperation on non-traditional security challenges in the region due to the magnitude of risks. This ranges from environmental challenges to gender issues. For example, Nepal signed the UN treaty on Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) in 2023 within the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The treaty establishes marine protected areas in the high seas and advances long-term conservation goals. The next step for Nepal is completing ratification. Despite being a land-locked (or rather, land-linked) country, Nepal recognizes that it is a stakeholder in the security of the high seas through its connections to the hydrological cycle and ports in the Bay of Bengal for overseas trade.
Another non-traditional security issue involves gender. Among the South Asian countries, Nepal was an early supporter and implementer of the UN Security Council resolution on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) that focuses on the role of women in preventing and resolving conflicts. Nepal adopted its first National Action Plan on WPS over a decade ago to meet its obligations under the UN resolution. It is now on to its second National Action Plan.
Yet, sometimes Nepal’s needs on non-traditional security can be misunderstood or lost in the context of great-power politics. Nepal is increasingly facing threats posed by natural disasters such as the 2015 earthquake and glacial lake outburst floods. As a result, Nepal continues to build its capacity to address environmental challenges and disaster risk in collaboration with partners through diplomatic forums and military exercises. For example, the Nepali Army benefits from capacity-building by the US to receive training and operate platforms that can contribute to disaster response operations. Yet, great-power politics can sometimes enter the conversation because Nepal needs as many partners as possible to help it address non-traditional security issues. In 2022, Nepal decided to withdraw its request to participate in the US State Partnership Program after it was seen through a big-powers lens rather than for the operational and tactical benefits of cooperation on missions like humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HA/DR).
- Looking ahead, how might Nepal’s foreign policy change if U.S.–China rivalry intensifies in South Asia?
I envision Nepal continuing its approach of being sensitive to this rivalry, but I think more important for Nepal would be its assessment of India’s view of US-China rivalry. This would especially be informed by India’s own threat perceptions of China and heightened concerns about the US in recent months. Nepal’s open border with India and unique geographic location are only two of the various factors that make India Nepal’s most important bilateral relationship and an unavoidable consideration in any tensions between China and the US. As a result, Nepal will carefully consider India’s stance as it evaluates how US-China rivalry evolves.
Regarding the US, the Trump administration plans to release National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy documents, which are expected to outline its priorities for the next few years. To date, administration officials have suggested that countering China’s aggression in the Indo-Pacific and encouraging allies and partners to increase their security burden-sharing contributions are among the top US defense priorities. Nepal may wish to monitor this discussion in the coming months for implications for its own foreign policy. More broadly, Nepal will need to rebuild domestically after the revolution that ousted the prime minister. The interim government’s foreign policy toward international partners will ideally enable the transition process.
- Finally, how can Nepal leverage the India–China collaboration-and-competition (2C) dynamic to its advantage?
There is a long-standing view that small states play off big powers like India and China. This may be wishful thinking at work by smaller countries (or suspiciousness by large ones) when considering how small states are fundamentally subject to coercion by large powers. I question Smaller South Asian countries’ actual success in exploiting big-power competition, and see potential risks to these countries if large powers view them as merely favoring the highest bidder without understanding the implications of India as the dominant country in their region. Rather than seeking to leverage strategic competition to its advantage, Nepal may wish to consider ways in which smaller states can augment their capacity, diversify their partnerships, and amplify their voices on the regional and world stages.
